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Post-2012 Burden Sharing: Towards an Ethical Approach∗ 
 
Lucas Kengmana and Jonathan Boston 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores how the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change 
should be shared by the international community. While it briefly surveys other 
desiderata for a new global agreement on climate change for the post-2012 period, its 
primary focus is on the ethical issues posed by the imperative to address human-
induced climate change, and in particular the principles and considerations that should 
inform an ethical approach to global burden sharing. 
 
The first part of the paper outlines the context surrounding the current international 
negotiations for a new global agreement on climate change, which is designed to take 
effect when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end 
of 2012. This includes consideration of the criteria that any new agreement must 
address and the relevance and importance of ethics at the international level. The 
second part examines burden sharing from an ethical perspective. It assesses the 
relevance and validity of a number of principles of distributive justice that are widely 
discussed in the relevant climate change literature – most notably, equality, capacity, 
historical responsibility, need, monetary costs and welfare costs. It then uses these 
principles to evaluate six proposed burden sharing frameworks. The third part 
considers the implications of these burden sharing frameworks for New Zealand. This 
includes a brief examination of the possible impacts of various proposed changes to 




It is widely accepted that adequately addressing climate change will involve real costs 
for the global community, both in order to achieve effective mitigation and to adapt to 
its effects. Securing a comprehensive and effective international agreement to take 
effect after the expiry of the first commitment period (2008-2012) under the Kyoto 
Protocol has the potential to lower these costs. If any new agreement is to be 
negotiated and successfully implemented, however, it will have to allocate these costs 
across countries in an efficient, equitable and politically viable manner.  
 
This paper provides an overview of the issues surrounding international burden 
sharing, both over the longer term and in relation to the immediate post-2012 period. 
Particular attention is given to the key ethical issues at stake. Part 1 outlines the 
context in which the current international negotiations, under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), are taking place. It then 
identifies a number of factors that a new global policy framework for addressing 
climate change will have to tackle in order to be successful, and highlights why the 
question of equity is of critical importance.  
                                                 
∗ This paper was presented as a background paper prepared for the ‘Post-2012 Burden 




Part 2 examines the principles and considerations that should inform an equitable 
framework for sharing the burden of mitigating climate change. Our analysis proceeds 
as follows. First, we outline and assess the principles of distributive justice relevant to 
mitigation.1 Second, we evaluate, on the basis these principles, the ethical merits of 
six burden sharing frameworks for mitigation. We conclude that none of the 
frameworks under examination fully satisfy the demands of justice because they are 
likely to entail developed countries taking on a smaller share of the burden than would 
be equitable. Given the political constraints on increasing the relative share of 
mitigation costs borne by developed countries, we examine whether developed 
countries can resolve this problem by taking greater responsibility for addressing 
adaptation, technology transfer and finance.   
 
Part 3 considers briefly the implications of these six burden sharing frameworks for 
New Zealand. Under each of these frameworks New Zealand will be expected to take 
on significant mitigation responsibilities. At the same time, the nature of the rules 
incorporated into any new international agreement on climate change, such as the 
rules governing land use, land-use change and forestry, will affect the relative costs 
borne by different countries. Compared to most other countries, the nature and content 
of these rules are particularly important for New Zealand because of its distinctive 
emissions profile and its relatively large carbon sinks.  
 
Part 1: Background considerations 
This part of our analysis considers three separate, but related, issues. First, we 
summarize the current context within which a new post-2012 climate change 
agreement is being negotiated. This includes a brief exploration of the UNFCCC, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan (endorsed by the UNFCCC conference in 
December 2007). Second, we consider the desiderata for a new climate change 
agreement for the immediate post-2012 period. Third, we examine how an ethical 
perspective should inform the debate about international burden sharing. 
 
The negotiating context 
 
Significant progress has been made in recent years, partly through cooperation across 
the global scientific community, to understand better the causes of climate change, its 
likely impacts and potential solutions.2 In 1988 the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This body is responsible for 
undertaking periodic, detailed assessments of the causes and consequences of climate 
change. To date, the IPCC has produced four comprehensive and authoritative 
assessments, the most recent in 2007. While vigorous debate continues on many 
specific scientific and policy issues, the body of evidence brought together by the 
IPCC provides robust evidence that the Earth’s mean surface temperature is 
increasing and that most of this increase can be attribute to human activity – 
specifically the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (largely from the 
                                                 
1 Note that for the purposes of this discussion the terms ‘distributive justice’, ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ are 
taken to be synonymous. 
2 This section draws heavily on Boston (2007). 
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burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, gas and oil). The reports of the IPCC have been 
instrumental in raising global awareness about the nature of climate change, the risks 
that global warming poses to major planetary systems and the policy options that are 
available for mitigation and adaptation. 
 
In Rio de Janeiro in 1992, at a United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (generally referred to as the ‘Earth Summit’), the world community 
endorsed a document known as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). This Convention, which took effect in 1994, has been 
ratified by 192 countries. It has, as its ultimate objective, the ‘stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic [i.e. human-induced] interference in the climate system’. 
The UNFCCC provides the negotiating framework for, and certain principles to 
guide, international cooperation on climate change. One of the central principles, as 
specified in Article 3 of the Convention, is that: 
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
 
The Convention also provided for a negotiating body, the Conference of the Parties, 
and envisioned that a series of protocols (or treaties) would be crafted over the 
ensuing decades to give concrete expression to its fundamental objectives.  
 
Prompted by mounting scientific evidence during the early-to-mid 1990s of human-
induced climate change, the global community commenced negotiations in 1995 
(under the so-called ‘Berlin Mandate’) to develop a protocol to curb the growth in 
greenhouse gas emissions. This eventually resulted in the crafting of the Kyoto 
Protocol in late 1997. The Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and has 
been ratified by at least 175 countries, including all industrialized countries with the 
exception of the United States.3 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 38 industrialized 
countries (known as Annex 1 Parties under the UNFCCC) agreed to fixed and legally-
binding responsibility targets4 for their greenhouse gas emissions during a five-year 
period (2008-12); this is known as the first commitment period (or CP1). Overall, 
Annex 1 Parties agreed to an aggregate reduction in their emissions of 5% relative to 
1990 levels. The precise target for each country is set out in Annex B to the Protocol. 
These targets vary quite considerably, with some countries accepting much deeper 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the term ‘industrialized countries’ means slightly different things in different 
contexts, and is changing over time. For instance, the membership of the OECD now includes Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey, none of which are listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. And the list of 
countries in Annex B is slightly different to those in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC (see IPCC, 2007d, 
p.774). 
4 Annex 1 Parties are not necessarily required under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their domestic 
emissions by the specific targets agreed to, but rather to take responsibility for reductions of the agreed 
magnitude. Parties have the option, if they wish, of achieving these reductions through the purchase of 
Kyoto-compliant emission allowances on the international market or via the Clean Development 
Mechanism. For this reason, the Kyoto targets should be thought of as responsibility targets rather than 
domestic reduction targets. 
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cuts than others. For instance, New Zealand’s target for CP1 is 100% of 1990 levels.5 
By comparison, Australia’s target is 108%, the European Union’s is 92%, while that 
of the United States is 93%. In order to achieve these targets in an effective and 
efficient manner, the Kyoto Protocol provided for the establishment of three so-called 
‘flexible mechanisms’ for CP1: an international emissions trading regime, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). For their part, 
developing countries agreed, under Article 10 of the Protocol, to take a range of 
measures designed to improve the quality of the reporting of their anthropogenic 
emissions and to ‘formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national … 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to 
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change’.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol constitutes no more than a limited step in the long journey to 
tackle climate change – a journey that will need to extend over many generations and 
require ongoing multilateral cooperation. Its authors fully recognized that constraining 
the growth of emissions of the developed world, while important, would never be 
enough to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, all the more so in 
a context of rapid economic growth in major developing countries such as China and 
India. Nor would a five-year cap make much difference to overall emissions. But 
those who crafted the Kyoto Protocol also recognized the necessity of actually taking 
a concrete step – however modest, partial and imperfect this step might be. For one 
thing, it was important to demonstrate that the global community could in fact 
cooperate in practical ways in order to achieve agreed, collective purposes. For 
another, it was important to put in place key institutional mechanisms, such as a 
global emissions trading scheme, that could lay the foundations for more substantial 
and effective mitigation measures in the future. Moreover, it was hoped that the 
Protocol would stimulate a range of domestic policy actions to address climate change 
– which, indeed, has been the case (IPCC, 2007, p.748). 
 
Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for the negotiation of subsequent 
commitment periods, and specifically required the Conference of the Parties (COP) to 
initiate discussions on new commitments at least seven years before the end of CP1. 
Accordingly, at COP 11 in Montreal in late 2005 the parties established a new 
negotiation process. Because the United States (and at this stage also Australia) had 
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, two separate bodies were created to consider post-
2012 issues: an Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) on ‘Further Commitments for Annex 
I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol’, and a ‘Dialogue on long-term cooperative action 
to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention’. The latter 
dialogue process embraced all parties to the UNFCCC. This bifurcated negotiation 
process was subsequently modified at COP 13 in Bali in December 2007, with the 
dialogue process being transmuted into a new Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). Both negotiating tracks have 
a common end date, namely COP 15 in Copenhagen in late 2009. 
 
It is not appropriate here to consider the details of the so-called Bali Action Plan or 
the full complexity of the issues surrounding the efforts to secure a new global climate 
                                                 
5 During the first commitment period (2008-2012), New Zealand is permitted to emit five times its 
1990 emissions levels and must take responsibility for emissions in excess of this amount (i.e. by 
purchasing Kyoto-compliant emission allowances). 
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change agreement at COP 15 (see Boston, 2008). Nevertheless, a number of points 
need to be emphasized.  
 
First, there is very little time to negotiate a new agreement, especially if the aim is to 
avoid any gap between CP1 and a second commitment period. Bear in mind that 
before any new international agreement can take effect it will need to be ratified by a 
substantial proportion of the parties to the UNFCCC and this process is likely to take 
a minimum of two years (i.e. given the complicated nature of the domestic political 
processes that will need to be navigated in many countries). Second, there are 
significant differences of view between the parties over the level of ambition, both for 
a second commitment period and for the longer term – i.e. how much global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be reduced below a business-as-usual 
scenario. Third, the parties are also deeply divided over how emission reductions 
should be achieved, including the nature of the measures that should be implemented 
and the allocation of responsibilities between different countries. For instance, not all 
developed countries accept the need for Annex 1 countries to take on new binding 
emission-reduction commitments, with the United States in particular preferring non-
binding ‘actions’ to binding ‘commitments’. Similarly, there are major disagreements 
over the respective contributions of developed and developing countries. Further 
complicating matters is the fact that there is no agreed definition of developed and 
developing countries (The Third World Network, 2008). 
 
These various disagreements are reflected in the wording of the Bali Action Plan. 
Under this plan, the post-2012 obligations of developed countries are stated as being: 
 
Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and 
reduction objectives … while ensuring the comparability of efforts among 
them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances 
 
Notice, in particular, the inclusion of the words ‘commitments or actions’. In effect, 
this represents a weakening of the measures required for CP1. At the same time, the 
reference to ‘comparability of efforts’ (see Box 1) reflects a desire to ensure that if 
some developed countries do not take on internationally binding commitments then 
their domestic policy measures must be broadly comparable to the burdens being 
borne by other developed countries. 
 
In relation to developing countries, the Bali Action Plan includes the following text:  
 
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions … in the context of sustainable 
development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-
building, in a measurable reportable and verifiable manner. 
 
There has been considerable debate over what precisely these words mean, but one 
thing is abundantly clear: developing countries will not be required to take on binding 
emission-reduction commitments for the second commitment period. 
 
Box 1: What is comparable effort? 
In the Bali Action Plan, developed countries have agreed to take on: 
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Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and 
reduction objectives…while ensuring the comparability of efforts among 
them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances. (italics 
added) 
 
This raises the question, what is comparable effort? Helme (2008) has attempted to 
address this question. He suggests that comparable effort might mean one of the 
following: 
 
• countries take on equal marginal abatement costs; 
• countries take on an equal percentage tonnage reduction of GHGs; 
• countries make equal combined sectoral efforts; 
• countries face an equal abatement cost per dollar of GDP; 
• countries take on equal abatement costs per capita; or 
• countries make an equal macroeconomic effort. 
 
As can be seen, the more direct interpretations of comparable effort render it 
similar to the principles based on monetary cost identified below. However, as 
argued below, principles based on monetary costs have little ethical justification. 
As a result, for comparable effort to have moral legitimacy, it must be interpreted 
in one of its more nuanced forms that takes into account more than just the 
monetary costs that countries bear. 
 
Factors underpinning a successful global climate treaty 
While this paper is primarily focused on investigating what would constitute an 
equitable distribution of the burden of tackling climate change, in practice any treaty 
on climate change must simultaneously address a number of different, and sometimes 
competing, goals.6 There are four fundamental requirements: any treaty must be 
equitable, environmentally effective, cost efficient and facilitate sustainable 
development. Additionally, it is desirable that a treaty promotes administrative 
simplicity, technical feasibility, political feasibility, predictability, flexibility and 
adaptability. We discuss equity in Part 2; the other goals are covered briefly below. 
 
It is crucial that any treaty is environmentally effective – that is, it must achieve the 
desired environmental outcome; unless it successfully contributes to reducing the 
growth of global GHG emissions (and hence contributes to the stabilization of GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere), a global climate treaty will fail its raison d'être. 
Likewise, any deal must be cost efficient – that is, it must achieve an environmentally 
effective solution at the lowest possible cost, or it is likely to be rejected by those who 
are negatively impacted by the costs of addressing climate change. Any deal will also 
have to provide developing countries with a means of achieving sustainable 
                                                 
6 These goals are gleaned from Boston and Kengmana (2007) who distilled the list from the following 
sources: Aldy et al (2003); Bodansky (2007); Boeters et al (2007); Claussen and Diringer (2007); 
Höhne et al (2007); IPCC (2007a); Lewis and Diringer (2007); Neuhoff et al (2007); Okereke et al 
(2007); Ott (2007); Schmidt and Helme (2006); Stern (2006); Ward et al (2006); and Wolf (2006). 
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development as they are unlikely to accept an agreement that prevents their citizens 
from enjoying the fruits of economic growth. 
 
Administrative simplicity is important, both because undue complexity will increase 
administrative and compliance costs and because it will exacerbate the potential for 
differences in interpretation, thereby causing inequitable and/or inefficient outcomes. 
Technical feasibility is also important as countries differ widely in their technical 
capacity, and in the quality and availability of relevant data. This limits the potential 
shape of any agreement.  
 
Political feasibility is important since to be effective any treaty must be embedded in 
domestic policy. This is all the more important in a context where international 
enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak. What constitutes a politically feasible 
agreement is likely to vary greatly from country to country and will depend on the 
attitudes and perceptions of the populace, the nature of both the formal and informal 
power structures, and the political will of a country’s leaders. Nonetheless, for all 
practical purposes, for an agreement to be politically feasible the governments of all 
major emitters must be reasonably confident that they are able to integrate the treaty 
into domestic policy without suffering major, long-term political damage.  
 
The effects of a new global treaty should be predictable both to ensure environmental 
effectiveness and so that its negative impacts can be adequately addressed. Such a 
treaty should also be flexible in order to allow for differences in national 
circumstances. Finally, any treaty which is designed to cover more than one 
(relatively brief) commitment period needs to provide for periodic reviews and other 
forms of flexibility so that it can be adjusted to take account of new scientific 
evidence and other relevant considerations.   
 
Box 2: Does an efficiency-equity trade-off exist in sharing the burden of 
climate change? 
 
Making ethical evaluations often implies making judgements about the relative 
values of efficiency and equity. For example, in optimal tax theory, imposing a tax 
generally decreases efficiency making people substitute away from the taxed 
activity towards the untaxed activity. Thus, the government collects less tax than it 
otherwise would and individuals choose activities they otherwise would not. This 
leads to a deadweight loss with both parties made worse off than they otherwise 
(theoretically) could be. 
 
At first glance, it seems a similar efficiency-equity trade-off exists in the case of 
mitigating climate change. Some countries have access to cheaper means of 
limiting emissions than others. As a result, it seems that a choice must be made 
between allocating reduction targets to those who can make the reductions at the 
lowest costs or to those who should bear the cost for equity reasons. That is, we 
must make a trade-off between efficiency and equity. 
 
However, the cap-and-trade regime embedded in the Kyoto framework (and in the 
other concrete burden sharing proposals) allows us to sidestep this issue because it 
enables countries to trade emissions with one another. Hence, countries that can 
make emission reductions at a relatively low cost may reduce more than their fair 
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share of emissions and sell their excess emission permits to countries that cannot 
easily reduce emissions locally. In a perfectly competitive market, the gains arising 
from these transactions would be split between both parties. As a result, the 
division of the burden does not have efficiency implications and becomes purely a 
question of equity. 
 
Although this theoretical result is promising, there are two reasons why an 
efficiency-equity trade-off may still arise in practice. First, developing countries 
do not yet fully participate in the cap-and-trade system. Instead, as outlined below, 
they only earn credits by taking part in the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Because of this, countries are not able to achieve emission reductions in a 
least-cost manner. Second, it is possible that market imperfections will prevent 
efficient outcomes. For instance, it is unclear whether markets will have sufficient 
liquidity to prevent market power and coercion from playing a role. If only a small 
number of countries are able to make emission reductions at a relatively low cost, 
while other countries must pay a higher price to reduce emissions locally, those 
able to cut emissions cheaply may hold back on their reductions to force others to 
pay a higher price. Similarly, if some countries are able to coerce others to trade 
with them by using political power, the outcome may be inefficient (as well as 
inequitable). 
 
The relevance and importance of ethics at the international level 
 
Do we have ethical responsibilities to other nations? 
 
Before we begin to investigate the characteristics of a just global policy framework to 
address climate change, we must establish that ethical considerations, including the 
concept of justice,7 do in fact apply in the international realm.  
 
Almost everyone accepts that, at least at times, there are good reasons for members of 
society to act ethically. That is to say, most accept that it is beneficial for people to act 
in a way that promotes the good of society rather than to act in a way that simply 
promotes their own self-interest. Some theorists argue, however, that justice does not 
apply on the international level. They hold that while there is sufficient consensus 
about ethical matters on the national level, on the international level this consensus 
breaks down. As a result, they suggest that countries only have minimal 
responsibilities in the international sphere. 
 
John Rawls (1993) supported this position. He suggested that although countries have 
an obligation to promote distributive justice between their citizens, these obligations 
do not extend beyond national borders. This asymmetry is justified because he 
believed that institutions are legitimised by a hypothetical social contract. While these 
contracts could clearly be formed on the national level, he argued, global contracts 
that guaranteed distributive justice would be highly controversial. Hence he 
concluded that countries do not have an inherent responsibility to look after the well-
being of other citizens. 
 
                                                 
7 Since there are a number of different uses of the terms ethics and justice, it is useful to clarify their 
use in this case. We take ethics to be the subject that deals with the selecting the right action from a 
social perspective. We take justice to be a principle or guideline that informs ethical decisions.  
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Michael Black (2001) offers a more contemporary defence of this position. He argues 
that the social contract that those who live in liberal nations implicitly agree to, 
includes a commitment on the part of the state to preserve where possible the 
autonomy of its citizens. While this agreement does not supersede other duties a state 
has, it implies that states should not compel their citizens to take actions unless these 
actions are necessary for society to function well. As such, it is perfectly consistent 
for countries to apply coercive force to ensure distributive justice within their own 
borders as this is (arguably) a necessary part of a well functioning society, without 
also promoting distributive justice internationally. While stopping short of concluding 
that countries have no international obligations, he argues that countries, without the 
approval of their citizens, are not justified in going any further than providing 
subsistence aid to other nations. 
 
Many scholars regard the positions advanced by Rawls and Black as implausible. For 
example, Thomas Pogge (1989, 1992, 1994 and 2003) argues that the country where a 
person is born is determined solely by chance. Accordingly, it is similar to other 
arbitrary factors such as a person’s race and gender, and thus should not be used as a 
basis for discriminating between people. On this basis, he concludes that it is more 
appropriate to form social contracts on an international level than on a national level. 
This implies that governments should consider global welfare rather than simply 
national self-interest in determining their course of action. As a result, according to 
Pogge, countries should take issues of global justice into account when negotiating, or 
indeed taking, any action on the international level. 
 
Even if Pogge’s objections are not considered to be a decisive a refutation of Rawls’ 
and Black’s positions, there are two other reasons why their arguments do not apply 
in the case of sharing the burden of climate change. First, since climate change is a 
collective action problem, the only effective way it can be addressed is through global 
cooperation. Thus, although robust institutions for global burden sharing do not yet 
exist, it is in our interests to build them. As such, it is in our interest to negotiate an 
international social contract and such a contract must be based on equitable principles 
to garner large scale acceptance. 
 
Second, it is clear that the actions of large emitters have harmed, and are continuing to 
harm, other countries. Therefore, developed countries have not only a distributive 
duty to take on greater costs than developing countries but also a moral debt for 
having created a problem that is adversely affecting others. Accordingly, even if 
considerations of distributive justice cannot play a role at the global level, in the case 
of climate change there are serious questions of retributive and commutative justice 





Will ethics play a role in the negotiation process? 
 
Another common objection is that even if we should take ethics into consideration 
when making decisions in international negotiations, in practice this is not how 
nations actually behave. Instead, countries merely take into account their own self-
interest. Therefore, if a particular country were to attempt to negotiate a fair outcome, 
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while all other countries negotiated solely from a position of self-interest, it may well 
end up hurting its own citizens without materially affecting the overall equity of the 
outcome.  
 
However, Bruce Burson (2008) identifies three reasons why ethics plays a role in 
climate change negotiations. First, there are real moral concerns that are fundamental 
to the question of sharing the burden. Some countries and individuals can make 
emission cuts at lower welfare costs than others. Likewise, some countries have 
played a much larger role in creating the problem than others. Therefore, a negotiation 
that failed to take into account these factors would be rejected by those who were 
morally entitled to a smaller burden. 
 
Second, the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and of equity are 
clearly embedded in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (Rajamani, 2006).  
Therefore, legally they must be taken into account.  
 
Third, politically, if the division of the burden is perceived to be unjust then the 
outcome will not have the legitimacy necessary to be sustained over time. On the 
international level, a legitimacy deficit is likely to lead to costly renegotiations every 
time the relative influence of a major country (or block of countries) changes. On the 
national level, there will always be political pressure for policymakers to renege on a 
commitment that is perceived to impose an unfair burden on their nation.  
 
For these three reasons, it is essential that future negotiations will need to find a 
genuinely just solution (or something very close), even if countries are fundamentally 
motivated by self-interest. 
 
Part 2: Towards an ethical division of the burden of mitigation 
 
Designing an ethical framework for burden sharing 
 
In order to analyse the various concrete frameworks that have been proposed for 
burden sharing, we must adopt a methodology for making ethical evaluations. A 
relatively common approach in the literature on climate change policy starts by 
identifying the intuitively appealing principles of distributive justice, such as those 
suggested by Joel Feinberg (1973) and David Miller (1976), treating them as the 
foundations of analysis. This approach has some appeal since it is relatively simple to 
apply and it allows us to take into account a large set of principles that seem 
intuitively important. It suffers, however, from two fundamental weaknesses: it is 
unable to adjudicate sufficiently between different principles of justice and it does not 
allow us to reject principles of justice except on intuitive grounds. This is acceptable 
if all the principles of justice are widely accepted and largely consistent, but causes 
problems if there are many competing principles of justice on offer. When the latter is 
the case, we are often faced with having to arbitrate between these theories on the 
basis of our intuition. This can often lead to irresolvable disagreements when 
individuals have intuitions that conflict. 
 
Thus, it is desirable to apply a more rigorous methodology in analysing the principles 
of justice. Here we will attempt to apply a technique often used in philosophical ethics 
of deriving principles of justice from foundational principles of normative ethics. 
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Having done this, we will be able to assess the strength of these principles based on 
their consistency with these normative frameworks. The principles that are supported 
by a number of normative ethical approaches can be considered strong; principles 
which are not supported by any can be rejected. Principles that survive this test can 
then be weighted against one another and other practical considerations to construct 
concrete policy frameworks with strong ethical foundations.  
 
In what follows, two theories of normative ethics are used to evaluate six principles of 
justice that have been proposed in the literature: equality, capacity, historical 
responsibility, need, monetary costs and welfare costs. We then identify other 
practical considerations that will need to be addressed in any concrete burden sharing 
regime. On this basis, we assess the ethical merits of six burden sharing frameworks 




Because there are many different normative ethical frameworks to choose from, we 
will not consider them all, but will instead limit ourselves to considering utilitarianism 
and a version of deontology. However, the selection of these two frameworks is far 
from arbitrary since they are the dominant strands of action-guiding normative ethics.8 
 
Both of these frameworks give clear action-guiding rules. Utilitarianism is a form of 
consequentialism and as such, it evaluates actions on the basis of their consequences. 
For utilitarianism, the important consequence is the overall level of happiness or 
welfare9 when each individual’s utility is given an equal weighting.  
 
Deontology rests on the belief that a set of rules (or categorical imperatives) exist that 
govern the way we act towards one another. Kant (1785, 1788) argued that these rules 
could be identified through rational reflexion and that only rules that: (1) do not treat 
other rational beings as means to ends; and (2) are universalisable (i.e. rules that one 
would wish others to use in the same circumstances) are morally acceptable. Rawls 
(1972) applied this approach to distributive justice, arguing that we could identify 
principles of distributive justice by considering what principles we would choose to 
govern society if we did not know in advance what position we would occupy in this 
society. Rawls concluded that in forming such a society, we would be interested in 
maximising the welfare of the least advantaged person and would only worry about 
the other members of society after we had done everything we could to improve this 
person’s lot. This position is sometimes referred to as Rawlsian egalitarianism.10 
Since Rawlsian egalitarianism is in many ways the political extension of deontology 
and its prescriptions are more clearly defined, we will use Rawlsian egalitarianism 
rather than deontology to assess the principles of justice below. 
                                                 
8 Virtue ethics is also a significant and growing strand of normative ethics. But it is far from clear that 
it is directly action guiding (Das 2002, but see Hursthouse 2001 for an example of how one might 
derive action guiding principles from virtue ethics). However, a number of authors especially Jamieson 
(1991, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001) have argued for a virtue ethical approach to addressing climate change. 
Because of space limitations, we do not explore this alternative here. 
9 The nature of welfare or happiness is a highly controversial topic. See Griffin (1988) for a good 
introduction to the issue.  
10 Here we interpret Rawlsian egalitarianism to include any who believe in maximising the position of 
the worst-off, whether this is judged in terms of material welfare, cardinal utility or capabilities.  
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Principles of justice 
 
Having examined the normative theories of ethical judgements, we are now in a 
position to analyse the principles of burden sharing that are most regularly advanced 




The first principle of burden sharing is equality. Roughly it can be expressed as the 
belief that, all else being equal, all individuals have an equal right to emit carbon. In 
practice, this is taken to imply that all countries should receive an equal per capita 
emission allowance provided there are no offsetting considerations. 
 
This principle rests on very strong ethical foundations. It is consistent with both 
utilitarianism, which requires that we give all individuals equal consideration, and 
egalitarianism, which requires that all individuals are treated equally. Therefore, it 




The principle of capacity holds that those who have a greater capacity to reduce 
emissions should be required to bear the greater burden of reducing emissions. In 
practice, this is taken to imply that countries with a high per capita GDP should 
reduce their emissions by more than those with a low per capita GDP.  
 
This principle is also largely consistent with the approaches listed above. Since the 
products that the wealthy will have to give up (e.g. luxury SUVs) to mitigate climate 
change will have a smaller impact on welfare than the products that the poor will be 
forced to go without (e.g. food) if they were to mitigate climate change, having the 
rich bear the cost will maximise overall utility. 
 
Cecil Pigou (1932) first suggested this theoretical conclusion (i.e. that the rich should 
be taxed more than the poor because marginal utility from wealth was diminishing) 
but it subsequently received less attention because it was difficult to verify 
scientifically (Cooter and Rapaport, 1984). Since then, however, numerous studies of 
happiness (both cross-sectional and time series) have confirmed that the marginal 
utility from money decreases with wealth (see Layard, 2005 for an in-depth survey). 
 
It is worth noting that most plausible approaches to discounting use a concave utility 
function to measure the welfare gain from consumption.12 That is, they give greater 
value to increases to low levels of consumption than equivalent increases to high 
levels of consumption. This provides a justification for the consumption of the current 
generation to be valued more highly than the consumption of future generations since 
the latter will probably be richer than the former (unless climate change impacts are 
drastic). A concave utility function also implies, however, that provided that inter-
personal and inter-temporal utilities are broadly analogous, developed countries 
                                                 
11 Others sometimes refer to this principle as the ‘ability to pay’ principle. 
12 That is, the increase in utility from one extra unit of consumption decreases as the total amount of 
consumption increases. 
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should take on a greater share of the costs of addressing climate change than 
developing countries. 
 
If developed countries object to the claim that they should bear higher costs simply 
because of their greater wealth, they implicitly support the treatment of utility as a 
linear or close to linear function of consumption (i.e. they support the claim that 
people value increases of wealth equally regardless of their original wealth). The only 
other factor that should play a role in the discount rate is the pure-time preference of 
consumption.13 Since, as Stern points out, applying a large pure-time preference on 
the national level amounts to little more than arbitrarily valuing the current 
generation’s consumption higher than future generations’ consumption the pure-time 
preference should not have a very significant impact on the discount rate (see Stern 
(2006), Quiggin (2006) and Rose (2007) for further discussion on this issue). A linear 
utility function and a small pure-time preference imply a low discount rate. Therefore, 
consistency requires that one must either accept a low discount rate, implying that 
much should be done currently to mitigate climate change, or one must accept that 
rich nations do have greater responsibility than poor nations to address climate 
change. For developed countries to do little while demanding that developing 
countries take on a large share of the burden is fundamentally inconsistent.  
 
As well as being acceptable under a utilitarian framework, the principle of capacity is 
consistent with Rawlsian egalitarianism since it protects the welfare of the worst-off 
in society. The only reason capacity might not be a valid principle of justice would be 
if developing countries in some way contributed to their own plight, and as a result 
lessening their burden would create perverse incentives. There is no evidence, 
however, that developing countries are primarily responsible for their lack of 
development (although there are undoubtedly cases where specific individuals, or 
groups of individuals, have contributed to the poor economic performance of their 




The principle of historical responsibility requires countries to make an effort to 
address climate change that is proportional to their responsibility for causing the 
problem. In practice this is taken to imply that countries that have been larger 
contributors to the current stock of GHGs in the atmosphere must take on 
proportionately larger emission-reduction commitments. 
 
It is unclear whether this principle can be supported by a utilitarian framework. Peter 
Singer (2002) argues that it can, because by making countries pay for their damage, it 
provides them with an incentive to take care in avoiding harm to others. It is 
debatable, however, whether countries could have been aware that GHGs were having 
a negative impact on the atmosphere prior to around 1990 (when the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change produced its first assessment report). Further, 
                                                 
13 It might be argued that the discount rate should be modified to take into account risk but it is not best 
practice to do this (Hepburn, 2006). Further, it is likely that including considerations of risk into the 
discount rate would actually further increase the argument to act now. This is because there is greater 
variance surrounding projections at high emission concentration levels than there is at low emission 
concentration levels. Therefore, a risk premium should be attached to the choice not to act to address 
climate change rather than to the choice to address climate change.  
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as Simon Caney (2005) points out, Eastern European countries that developed 
relatively early but experienced significant economic contraction during the 
immediate post-communist period would have to bear a fairly significant portion of 
the costs; yet their capacity to do so is limited. It seems contrary to the aim of 
maximising utility to force these costs upon them. 
 
From a Rawlsian perspective, the fact that developed countries benefited by creating 
this climate problem, adds credence to call for redistribution from developed countries 
to developing countries. But this position faces two objections. First, it is commonly 
accepted that countries cannot be held responsible for their past actions because, as 
discussed above, they were unaware of the impact their emissions were having. Henry 
Shue (1992) shows, however, that this objection does not hold much weight by 
highlighting the distinction between moral responsibility and responsibility for 
damage. While knowledge is required in order to hold someone morally responsible, 
Shue argues that it is not necessary to hold them responsible for paying for the 
damage they do. He points out that if he were to spray his grass with a substance 
which he believed to be water but which was in fact a toxic chemical and if the 
resulting run off was to destroy his neighbour’s lawn, he would be responsible for 
replacing the lawn although he could not be held morally or criminally responsible for 
the outcome. 
 
A more significant objection is that those who were responsible for early GHG 
emissions have now passed away. It seems unfair that the children of those who 
caused these emissions should be required to pay for their parent’s mistakes. Shue 
points out, however, that if the children of a thief benefit in some way from their 
parent’s actions, they would be obliged to compensate those who had been harmed. It 
seems reasonable to hold that those living in developed countries have benefited in 
various ways from the emissions of their ancestors. Such benefits include altruistic 
transfers from their parents as well as the advantages of modern education and health 
care systems that only the governments of developed countries can provided. So these 
objections not withstanding, it cannot be ruled out as a relevant consideration in 




The principle of need appeals to the fact that individuals need to produce a certain 
minimal quantity of emissions simply to survive. But it is not clear how exactly this 
principle would be applied in practice. It might guarantee all countries a subsistence 
level of emission rights or it might simply require that the poorest countries are 
provided a level of emissions that they can survive upon. 
 
In either case, this principle does not appear to add anything of substance to the 
capacity principle discussed above. Further, as Stephen Gardiner (2004) points out, it 
is difficult to define what would constitute a subsistence level of emissions. 
Individuals in developed countries with access to modern technology and the ability 
to substitute large amounts from discretionary spending towards emission abatement 
can probably subsist on relatively low levels of emissions. Individuals in developing 
countries, however, who do not have access to low-emission technologies may well 
require a higher level of emissions in order to survive.  
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Notwithstanding this fact, it is evident that the extra emissions produced by 
discretionary consumption in developed countries far outweighs any extra emissions 
that may result from inferior technology in developing countries. Therefore, an equal 
per capita distribution of emissions rights would very likely give developing countries 
sufficient emission allowances to provide for their subsistence level of consumption. 





This principle holds that countries that can achieve emission reductions at a low cost 
should take on more commitments than countries that face a higher cost to achieve the 
same reductions. In its sharpest form, it can be interpreted to mean that countries 
should face an equal marginal cost for emission reductions, which would lead to an 
efficient outcome. A different form of this principle is to require countries to take on 
equal total costs per capita for reductions, which is consistent with a particular form 
of comparable effort (see Box 1).  
 
Achieving emission reductions at least cost is intuitively appealing. But this outcome 
can be readily achieved provided market mechanisms are built into future 
international policy frameworks (see Box 2). Further, there is little reason to believe 
that allocating mitigation burdens on the basis of monetary costs will promote equity. 
It does not seem fair to require a country to bear a large proportion of the costs simply 
because it can do so at least cost. 
 
Requiring countries to take on equal per capita costs of emission reductions seems at 
first sight to be a more equitable principle. There is a degree to which the cost a 
country faces to reduce emissions is arbitrary. Some countries have excellent sources 
of renewable energy and others do not; some countries are heavily reliant on sectors 
in which the cost of abatement is high; others are dominated by industries which face 
low abatement costs. It seems unjust to impose equal per capita emission reductions 
on countries when this approach entails high costs for some countries and low costs 
for others simply based on their luck of endowment. 
 
While this claim may have merit, it is unclear whether the use of money as a metric 
for true cost is justifiable either from a utilitarian or a Rawlsian egalitarian point of 
view. In a utilitarian framework, what is important is the overall level of happiness or 
welfare. As discussed above, the marginal utility gained from gains in wealth tends to 
decrease as wealth increases. Thus, simply seeking to equalise monetary cost will not 
give us an accurate measure of the true costs borne by the parties. 
 
From a Rawlsian egalitarian perspective, equalising monetary costs per capita is even 
less acceptable because it requires the worst-off to bear an equal cost to the best-off. 
The only case in which this would be acceptable is if countries only differed 
(economically) in the costs they faced in addressing climate change. This is far from 
the case in the real world where there is extreme divergence between the richest and 





One way of saving the cost principle is to focus on welfare costs rather than monetary 
costs. This entails weighing the monetary costs faced by countries in reducing their 
emissions to take into account the relative wealth of the parties involved. At present, 
there is no agreed system of weights for the monetary costs at face by countries with 
different wealth levels.  
 
Applied to welfare costs rather than monetary costs, the principle of least-cost 
reduction fares much better from a utilitarian perspective as equalising the marginal 
utility losses in each country would maximise total utility. Further, it would avoid 
punishing countries that face high costs because of their poor environmental 
endowments. 
 
From an egalitarian perspective, it is not clear that the principle of equal welfare cost 
is a reasonable ethical principle. It fails to guarantee that the circumstances of the 
worst-off will improve and, in fact, allows the position of the worst-off to worsen in 
order to maximise overall utility. But this problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that in practice it is likely that maximising overall utility will be consistent with 
raising the living standards of the worst-off in society because of the decreasing 
marginal utility of income. 
 
Applying the principle of welfare costs becomes tricky if we try to take into account 
previous actions. Doing this raises questions about accounting for self-imposed costs, 
such as substantial investments in carbon-intensive technology. In the short run, 
developed countries may well face higher costs from reducing emissions than 
developing countries since in many cases they have already invested heavily in 
carbon-intensive technologies and infrastructure whereas developing countries, with 
fewer investments, can more readily choose low-carbon options. In our view, the case 
for giving developed countries easier targets simply because they have high sunk 
costs is not strong. 
 
On balance, the principle of welfare costs appears more justifiable than the principle 
of monetary costs. While there are some questions surrounding its consistency with 
the egalitarian approach, it nonetheless can be considered a principle with a sound 
ethical foundation. 
  
Applying justice in an evolving temporal context 
 
When designing a global architecture for burden sharing, it is important to take into 
account the fact that the particular circumstances of countries (e.g. their level of 
economic development and emissions per capita) are not static but are likely to 
change over time, possibly significantly. Furthermore, applying the principles of 
justice that we have considered will have dynamic implications for the relative burden 
that countries should bear. For example, if a country with a proportionately large 
historical responsibility for climate change (e.g. the US) were to take on extra costs in 
the short-to-medium term in recognition of this responsibility, then in the longer term 
its relative culpability for accumulated emissions will diminish. It is important that a 







The importance of the principle of equality is likely to grow over time as other 
considerations decline in relevance. In the absence of differentiating factors, equity 




It is unclear whether countries’ GDP per capita (and therefore capacity) will converge 
over time. The question of whether such convergence will occur has been long 
debated in development economics but so far no consensus has emerged. All that can 
be concluded is that if relative per capita income levels do not change, the principle of 




Assuming that developed countries take significant steps to address climate change, 
the importance of the principle of historical responsibilities will diminish over time. 
This is because the proportion of the total GHG stock attributable to high current 
emitters will gradually decrease. Further, if these emitters take on more substantial 
mitigation efforts as a result of their greater responsibility, culpability for the future 




Like capacity, it is difficult to assess how relevant the principle of need will be in the 
future. All that can be concluded is that if nothing changes, the principle need will 




The monetary costs countries face will tend to converge over time as countries are 
able to alter the composition their capital stock. However, it is not clear how complete 
this convergence will be. Asymmetries in access to renewable resources are very 
likely to continue. Thus, the significance of this principle will decrease over time but 




The importance of welfare costs will diminish over time as the differences in the 
monetary cost of mitigation decrease. The only difference is that changes in relative 










Concrete burden sharing frameworks 
 
Having identified the relevant principles of distributive justice, we are now in a 
position to judge how well six of the proposed frameworks for burden sharing address 
these principles. It is worth noting two things at this point. First, these principles of 
distributive justice can be operationalised by using empirical proxies (see Table 1). In 
the main, these proxies are uncontroversial and widely applied in the relevant 
literature. Second, the fact that one framework of burden sharing takes into account 
more of the principles of justice than another, does not imply that it is superior. 
Rather, what is at stake in this case is whether the framework gives appropriate 
weighing to the various principles.  
 





Equality Emissions per capita 
Capability GDP per capita 
Responsibility Historical emissions; historical responsibility for global 
warming 
Need Percentage of population above the absolute poverty 
line; percentage of population living with income below 
a certain level; average income of below a certain level 
Equal monetary cost The impact on GDP that the commitment will have 
Equal welfare cost The cost in terms of GDP that the commitment will have 
adjusted by a country’s wealth. 
 
In what follows below, we will outline and assess six frameworks for sharing the 
burden of mitigation. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol: The First Commitment Period 
 
The obligations imposed on countries during the first commitment period (CP1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol reflected the distinction, inherent in the UNFCCC, between 
industrialized (or Annex 1) countries and non-industrialized (or non-Annex 1) 
countries. As noted earlier, Annex 1 countries were obliged to take on binding 
emission-reduction commitments while non-Annex 1 countries were excluded from 
such responsibilities.  
 
To some degree it can be argued that CP1 embraced the principles of capability, 
historical responsibility and monetary costs – but only in a very loose fashion. To 
quote the draft Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008, p.300):  
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, emissions budgets for Annex 1 countries for 2008-
12 were defined as percentages of 1990 emissions, ranging within a relatively 
narrow band from 92 per cent to 110 per cent of base year emissions, around 
the average allocation of 95 per cent, with further differentiation within the 
European Union. Differentiation between countries was negotiated on an ad 
hoc basis, with little reference to underlying principles for allocation across 
countries, although on average richer countries signed up to larger reductions. 
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Annex 1 parties that fail to make the required emission reductions domestically are 
allowed to meet their responsibility targets by trading with other parties that have 
spare emission credits.14 While developing countries were not required to take on 
binding emission-reduction commitments during CP1, they are allowed to earn 
certified emission reductions (CERs) by participating in the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows developing countries to earn emission 
allowances via projects which reduce emissions from a business-as-usual level. These 
credits can then be traded to help developed countries meet their emission-reduction 
commitments. 
 
Even at the time of the crafting of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol the division 
of the world into two separate, distinct blocks was simplistic and failed to take proper 
account of the significant differences both within the industrialized block and within 
the developing world. To compound matters, some Annex 1 countries, even in the 
early-to-mid 1990s, had lower GDP per capita than some non-Annex 1 countries (e.g. 
certain oil rich states). Since the early 1990s, of course, many developing countries 
have experienced very rapid growth, while some developed countries have grown 
only modestly, if at all. As a result, the current picture is even more complicated than 
was the case when the UNFCCC was being drafted. Moreover, the rapidly changing 
pattern of economic development since 1997, when the emission budgets for CP1 
were agreed, further calls into question the logic of the CP1 commitments. 
 
While the Kyoto Protocol makes provision for further commitments periods following 
the expiry of CP1, it contains little guidance on how the burden of reducing global 
emissions should be shared over the long run. Much the same can be said with respect 
to its parent document, the UNFCCC. Indeed, while Article 3 of the Convention refers 
to ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, it does not 
enunciate in precise terms how these responsibilities should be ‘differentiated’, or 
which responsibilities are ‘common’ and which are ‘differentiated’. Arguably, most of 
the principles of justice considered in this paper are compatible with the provisions of 
the UNFCCC, but the Convention does not attempt to weigh these principles: this is a 
matter for the parties to negotiate. To complicate matters, it has other limitations, 
some of which have already been noted. In our view, there is no case, in ethical terms, 
for setting future emission-reduction targets and commitments in the manner adopted 
for CP1. At the same time, the wording of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in 
relation to burden sharing is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a range of post-
2012 frameworks. Accordingly, a more ethical approach would not necessarily be 
incompatible with existing international instruments. 
 
Contraction and convergence 
 
The Contraction and Convergence (C&C) approach is built on the premise that human 
equality is the core ethical principle for determining how the burden of mitigation 
should be shared. In distributing the burden of mitigation, it first determines the level 
of emissions per person consistent with the requirement to stabilize GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere. Having done this, it imposes emission-reduction 
                                                 
14 These may have come from developed countries that have reduced their emissions more than 
required or from developing countries through the CDM. 
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trajectories on all countries above the average that require them to converge to the 
desired level of emissions per capita by a given date while ensuring that these 
reduction paths are consistent with achieving an acceptable level of GHG 
concentrations. Countries that are well above the acceptable per capita emission level 
receive steep reduction trajectories while those close to the target receive flatter 
reduction trajectories (see Figure 1). Countries below the average are allocated more 
than they currently need in recognition of their ethical claim on those emissions. This 
triggers a reallocation of resources from developed countries to developing countries, 
providing developing countries with an incentive to support the agreement. Emissions 
trading between countries is permitted. Hence, those countries with per capita 
emissions below their reduction targets may sell their permits to other countries that 
fail to make the necessary reductions.  
 
Figure 1: Contraction and convergence 
 
Note: IC - Industrial countries, ADC - Advanced Developed Countries and LDC - Least Developed 
Countries.  
Source: Höhne, Phylipsen, and Moltmann (2007), p. 14.  
 
In the long run, this approach focuses on the principle of equality giving no 
consideration to the other principles of justice. In the short run, however, it balances 
the principle of equality against considerations of short-term monetary costs. It is a 
very cost efficient framework since all parties are included in the system from the 
beginning and it is likely to be environmentally effective for the same reason. It is 
also a relatively straightforward system to negotiate since there is a clear methodology 
for determining each country’s share of the global burden. Partly because of these 
virtues, the C&C approach has found favour in many quarters, and has recently been 
supported by the Garnaut Climate Change Review. 
 
Common but differentiated convergence 
 
The Common but Differentiated Convergence (CDC) modifies the C&C approach to 
better account for capacity and historical responsibility in the short run. Instead of 
requiring all countries to begin emission reductions immediately, it allows non-Annex 
I countries to increase their emissions until they reach a percentage threshold of the 
global per capita average which should be declining over time (see Figure 2). Because 
developing countries are not originally bound by emission reduction targets, they do 
not receive excess emission allowances, except via the CDM (or some equivalent 
mechanism). In all other ways, the approach is the same as C&C. 
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Figure Two: Common but differentiated convergence 
 
Note: IC - Industrial countries, ADC - Advanced Developed Countries and LDC - Least Developed 
Countries.  
Source: Höhne, Phylipsen, and Moltmann (2007), p. 14. 
 
Judged against C&C, CDC fares better when importance is placed on the principles of 
capacity and historical responsibility. In other words, if these principles are 
considered relevant, then CDC must be judged superior to C&C because it better 
takes into account these principles.15 If not, then CDC should be considered inferior 
because of the efficiency and effectiveness losses it implies. 
 
The staged approach 
 
The staged approach divides countries into groups similar to the Annex I/non-Annex I 
division in the UNFCCC and assigns them different types of targets according to their 
grouping. Countries in the less well-off groups are assigned less stringent targets than 
the countries in the better-off groups. In setting these targets, negotiators must ensure 
that the overall effort is consistent with achieving an acceptable GHG stabilisation 
target. 
 
Various proposals have been suggested for differentiating between countries and 
assigning targets (Claussen and McNeilly, 1998; Gupta, 1998; Storey, 2002; Höhne et 
al., 2003; Bodansky, 2003; Ciqui et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 2003; and Ott et al., 2004). 
For illustrative purposes we present the proposal outlined in Blok et al (2007). Under 
this proposal countries are divided into four groups based on their levels of emissions 
per capita. Countries in the first group receive ‘no lose’ targets which allow them to 
earn emission credits for beating their targets but impose no penalties should they 
miss them. The second group of countries are given intensity targets which require 
them to reduce their emissions per unit of GDP. The third group are required to take 
on stabilisation targets which require them to stabilise their emission levels within a 
certain timeframe. The final group are given emission-reduction targets. Under this 
proposal, the level of these emission targets is adjusted to ensure that the overall 
volume does not exceed the desired level. As countries grow economically over time, 
they will move into higher groups and be expected to take on more stringent targets. 
Because of its flexibility, the staged approach can take into account any or all of the 
                                                 
15 Although it still might not give adequate consideration to either of these principles. 
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principles of justice discussed above. On the downside, this could make negotiations 
very complex.  
 
The Brazilian proposal 
 
The Brazilian proposal was originally submitted by Brazil in 1997 (UNFCCC, 1997). 
It builds on the framework of the Kyoto Protocol but calls on Annex I countries to 
accept emission-reduction commitments that take into account their responsibility for 
the increase in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Thus, countries’ reduction 
targets depend on their historical contribution to GHG concentrations. 
 
The appropriateness of this approach depends on the significance of historical 
responsibility relative to the other principles of justice. Even if it is correct, however, 
to give historical responsibility a high weighting, the Brazilian proposal suffers from 
the fact that it is difficult to estimate historical emissions and thus difficult to 
apportion blame in an accurate manner. For such reasons, this approach has not 
generated widespread support. 
 
The triptych approach 
 
The triptych approach allocates emission rights to Annex I countries primarily on the 
basis of monetary cost. However, instead of setting reduction targets through 
negotiation, it specifies a formula for dividing the burden between countries. In doing 
this, it analyses countries’ sectoral composition and treats emissions from the various 
sectors differently. A number of formulae have been proposed (e.g. Blok, Phylipsen, 
and Bode, 1997; Phylipsen, Groenenberg, and Blok, 1998; Groenenberg, Phylipsen, 
and Blok, 2001; Hohne et al., 2005) which cover a range of sectors. These included 
heavy industry, power, domestic consumption, industry, waste, agriculture, land use 
change, and forestry. 
 
Three sectors were covered in the original triptych proposal (Blok, Phylipsen, and 
Bode, 1997): heavy industry, power, and domestic consumption. Emissions from 
heavy industry and power were assumed to face upward pressure from rising GDP but 
downward pressure from improved efficiency (though these would adjust at different 
rates). Emissions from domestic consumption were expected to converge to an equal 
per capita level across countries over time. These sector reductions are then added 
together to determine a country’s overall emission reduction target. 
 
Because this approach does not take into account any of the other principles of justice, 
it lacks a strong moral foundation. However, it may be better able to encourage 
widespread international buy-in because it addresses a large number of concerns 
developed countries have and it does not impose excessively heavy costs on any 
country. 
 
An ethical assessment of the burden sharing frameworks 
 
All the burden sharing frameworks discussed above either fail to integrate developing 
countries comprehensively into a cap-and-trade system or fail to distribute the costs of 
mitigation fairly between developed and developing nations. It is clear from the 
principles of justice considered in this paper that developing countries should, at the 
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very least, have per capita emission allowances that are equal to those of developed 
countries. This follows from the principle of equality. In fact, a good case can be 
made, on the basis of the principles of capability, historical responsibility and equal 
welfare costs, that most developing countries should have per capita emission 
allowances that are larger, on average, than those of developed countries – at least for 
a period of time.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, all six of the frameworks considered here either do not fully 
include developing nations within a global emissions cap-and-trade regime or allocate 
such countries substantially fewer emission rights per capita over the short-to-medium 
term than their ethical entitlement. For instance, under a C&C approach the average 
citizen of China would receive fewer emission rights over the next 50 years or so than 
their counterparts in the US. Neither of these outcomes is desirable. The first causes 
losses in efficiency and increases the risk that mitigation efforts will not be 
environmentally effective. The second, ceteris paribus, is not equitable and is likely 
to be rejected by developing countries.  
 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to find an alternative method of distributing the burden of 
mitigation. Even if the political leaders of developed countries were willing to commit 
to taking on these costs, it is likely to prove political untenable for them to do so, 
because addressing mitigation will impose immediate, significant and transparent 
costs on the citizens of developed countries. Furthermore, although all of the burden 
sharing frameworks are theoretically efficient, provided emission rights can be traded, 
market imperfections may prevent the cap-and-trade system from functioning in a 
fully effective manner (see Box 2). Hence, it may be wise from an efficiency 
perspective to avoid situations where certain countries are heavily dependent on 
purchasing emission rights in order to meet their international obligations. 
 
Given these constraints, is there an alternative way for developed countries to meet 
their ethical responsibilities? One solution is for these countries to take on an even 
greater share of the global effort required to address adaptation, technology 
development and transfer, and the financing of climate change action. As discussed in 
Box 3, by comprehensively addressing some of the inequities of the current situation 
through contributing more to finding solutions to the challenge of adaptation, 
developed countries can reduce the size of their mitigation responsibility. Further, 
developed countries are in a position to share technologies that abate emissions and to 
bear the cost of developing new, more efficient low-carbon technologies. They also 
have the financial capacity to ensure that those who need it are able to access finance 
to address climate change. Thus, it is both possible and desirable to implement one of 
the suggested burden sharing frameworks and still come close to an equitable 
outcome if developed countries take on greater efforts in the other core areas of 
addressing climate change. 
 
It might be objected that at present developed countries are not only doing less than 
their fair share with respect to mitigation but they are also doing less than their fair 
share with respect to adaptation, technology transfer and finance. Equally, it may be 
no more feasible politically for them to increase their efforts in these areas than it is 
for them to expand their mitigation efforts. While there may be some truth in these 
claims, there are a number of reasons why it is likely to be easier for developed 
countries to take additional actions in these other areas in place of tougher mitigation 
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commitments. First, unlike most mitigation efforts, the costs of addressing adaptation 
(and technology transfer and finance) are more likely to be borne directly by 
governments (and thus indirectly by all taxpayers) rather than directly by emitters. 
Politically, therefore, measures to assist developing countries to adapt to climate 
change may be easier to implement than those associated with more stringent 
mitigation efforts. Second, technology transfers are likely to have productivity 
spillovers that increase output in developing countries leading to win-win situations. 
Third, developed countries have access to capital at lower costs and therefore can 
finance climate change efforts (whether mitigation or adaptation related) more 
cheaply than developing countries, thereby producing mutually beneficial results. 
 
Box 3: The relationship between the principles of justice in mitigation and 
adaptation 
 
Most of the literature on burden sharing applies the various principles of justice 
discussed above to the question of mitigation. However, such principles can also 
be applied, with minimal amendments, to the question of who bears the cost of 
adaptation.  
 
In doing this, however, it becomes clear that the degree to which a principle is 
applied in the case of mitigation affects the extent to which it should be applied to 
adaptation. This is most evident in the case of the principle of historical 
responsibility. If countries take on mitigation in proportion to their responsibility 
for the current problem, they have less of a duty to take on a greater responsibility 
when it comes to adaptation. Conversely, if countries are willing to cover the full 
costs of adaptation in proportion to their responsibility for climate change, it is less 
clear that they must take on more stringent mitigation targets.16 
 
Similarly, although not as straightforwardly, it seems that there is some potential 
to apply the other principles of justice less stringently in one area while applying 
them more stringently in the another.  
 
Far from being merely a procedural detail, however, real benefits may flow from 
applying some principles of justice to mitigation and others to adaptation. For 
example, applying the principle of historical responsibility solely to adaptation has 
several advantages. First, it is consistent with the polluter-pays principle which is 
often applied to other environmental issues. Second, it would produce incentives 
for countries to actively reduce their emissions now even if other countries do not 
take similar steps, because by doing so they would reduce their share of the cost of 






                                                 
16 Of course, there are likely to be few cases in which countries fully negate their historical emissions 
with future mitigation efforts or in which countries bear the full cost of the impact of their previous 
actions, including the costs of adaptation. Accordingly, the principle of historical responsibility is 
likely to remain of continuing relevance. 
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Part 3: Implications for New Zealand 
 
This section of the paper considers the implications of these different frameworks for 
New Zealand. It also explores the implications of changes in the rules and parameters 
surrounding such issues as GHG emission accounting, base years, and land use, land-
use change and forestry. Changes to the current Kyoto rules and parameters are likely 
to be controversial because their impact will vary from country to county (i.e. there 
will be winners and losers whatever the change). Because of the complexity of the 
issues, we will limit ourselves to making qualitative judgements about the relative 
cost of the different frameworks rather than attempting to estimate a quantitative 
figure for costs. Likewise, we will not attempt to set out in concrete terms precisely 
what New Zealand should do from an ethical perspective. Nevertheless, it is clear on 
the basis of the principles considered in Part 2 that New Zealand will need to take on 
a large share of the burden of mitigation in per capita terms.  
 
The previous discussion has highlighted that none of the frameworks considered is 
superior in all respects. Further, it demonstrated that mitigation effort should not be 
thought of in isolation from effort in adaptation, technology transfer and finance. This 
means that in determining the level of mitigation effort a variety of considerations 
need to be taken into account. 
 
New Zealand will face different mitigation costs depending on which broad 
framework of burden sharing is used. Moreover, the nature and content of the burden- 
sharing framework will have a greater impact on New Zealand than many other 
developed countries because of its unique emissions profile and relatively large 
carbon sinks.  
 
Contraction and convergence 
 
Because of New Zealand’s relatively high level of per capita emissions (see Figure 3), 
a C&C approach is likely to place a large burden on New Zealand in the short-to-
medium term. Thus, if the international community decides to set a target that 
requires developed countries to reduce their emissions (or at least take responsibility 
for reducing emissions) by 25% by 2020 relative to 1990 levels (and recent scientific 
evidence suggests that a cut of at least this amount is necessary to avoid drastic 
climate change), it is likely that New Zealand will be required to take on a 

























































































































































Source: Claussen (2007), based on data from the International Energy Agency. Reproduced in 
Boston and Kengmana (2007). 
 
While these cuts would be costly, it is important to note that this framework is very 
likely to be both environmentally effective and economically efficient and, as such, it 
may represent the best case scenario if New Zealand is serious about cutting 
emissions. 
 
Common but differentiated convergence 
 
This approach would have similar implications to C&C but would increase the cost 
New Zealand faces. This is because in the short-to-medium term developed countries 
would be expected to bear a greater proportion of the mitigation effort. Against this, if 
such an approach is more likely than C&C to induce developing countries to sign up 
to a global treaty, then these costs may be justifiable. 
 
The staged approach 
 
Under a staged approach, New Zealand is likely to be required to take on a less 
stringent responsibility target than it would under either C&C or CDC. This is 
because it is more likely to take into account the cost of reducing emissions in 
different countries. Because the current costs of reducing emissions from the 
agricultural sector are relatively high and because potential gains from energy 
efficiency are limited in New Zealand since a large proportion of its energy comes 
from renewable sources, it faces mitigation costs that are above the developed world 
average. Against this, the staged approach is likely to be less environmentally 
effective and economically efficient than either C&C or CDC, so there is a risk that 




The Brazilian approach 
 
It is unclear whether taking historical responsibility into account will have a 
significant impact on the share of the burden borne by New Zealand. This is because 
its responsibility for historic emissions (in CO2 terms) as a percentage of total global 
responsibility is probably similar to its current percentage contribution to global CO2 
emissions. There is, however, significant uncertainty surrounding current projections 
of historical responsibility, and currently there are no accurate projections of historical 
responsibility in CO2e terms, largely because it is very difficult to estimate previous 
levels of non-CO2 GHG emissions.  
 
Although basing a new global climate treaty on considerations of historical 
responsibility may be less expensive for New Zealand than other approaches, the 
difficulties surrounding measurements of past emissions and the risk that it will not be 
environmentally effective reduce its attractiveness. As a result, it would not be a 




For the reasons mentioned above, New Zealand is likely to face lower costs in 
frameworks that take into account the cost and feasibility of emission reductions 
because of the unique challenges it faces (see Boston 2007a, esp. chapters 8-10). On 
the one hand this approach may attract significant buy-in for developed countries as it 
limits the cost any single country must bear. On the other hand, it is unlikely that 
developing countries would be prepared to take on similar targets given their relative 
lack of capacity and historical responsibility. In any event, this approach is largely 
inconsistent with the principles of justice identified above.  
 
Impacts of rule changes 
 
New Zealand will also be affected by any changes to the rules that govern how 
emissions are accounted for in the Kyoto Protocol. Although it is difficult to analyse 
the ethical merit any such rule changes because one cannot straightforwardly apply 
the principles of justice to them, it is important for any future treaty to be as complete 





The science and issues surrounding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
are complex.17 Because of this complexity, the rules governing LULUCF in CP1 
have, ‘gaps and anomalies…that make no sense from either a climate or a land 
management point of view’ (Macey 2007, p. 182).  
 
Changes to the rules related to the accounting of forestry are of particular importance 
to New Zealand. At present, countries do not earn credits from the emission 
                                                 
17 This section draws upon Ward and James (2007). 
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reductions attributable to forests planted before 1990. Furthermore, reforestation is 
only recognised if it takes place at the location of the original forest. 
 
New Zealand stands to gain if either of these rules is modified. It will gain from 
changes to the rules surrounding pre-1990 forests because it has significant pre-1990 
forests. Likewise, it will benefit from extra flexibility with respect to rules about 
where forests may be replanted. This will allow New Zealand to allocate its land 
between forestry and agriculture (and other uses) in an optimal manner. Finally, 
including developing countries in LULUCF agreements will benefit New Zealand by 
increasing the value of its timber exports. 
 
Global warming potentials 
 
To simplify the setting of reduction targets and the trading of emission rights, the 
IPCC provides a method for aggregating GHGs into a single unit, CO2e. In particular, 
the UNFCCC has used the second IPCC’s report’s best estimates of the Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) of each GHG over a 100 year period and used these to set 
conversion ratios for converting GHGs into CO2e. 
 
The scientific estimates of the GWPs of the various gases change as science evolves; 
as a result the IPCC’s current best estimates of the GWP of various gases differ from 
the estimates used to set the conversion ratios. Thus, there exists a trade-off between 
the accuracy gained from using the most up to date measure of GWP and the 
unpredictability caused by changing emission ratios. Further, there are questions 
about the choice of a 100 years time horizon: it is not clear that we should only be 
interested of the effects of gases over their first 100 years. Changing the time horizon 
radically changes the conversion ratios of short lived GHGs such as methane. Using 
100 years as the time horizon does not account for the fact that in the long run 
emissions of CO2 (which are not fully removed from the atmosphere by natural 
processes) must fall to zero while emissions of other gases (are fully removed) merely 
need to be reduced to a stable level. 
 
The profile of New Zealand’s responsibility targets will be significantly shaped by the 
way GWP is accounted for in a future treaty. Any increase in the time horizon used 
will reduce the size of New Zealand’s CO2e emissions, as current best measure show 
that the conversion ratio drops from 25 to 7.6 for methane and from 298 to 153 for 
nitrous oxide if a 500 year time horizon is used. However, New Zealand’s CO2e 
emission levels stand to rise if conversion ratios are updated to current best estimates 
since the GWP of methane is now calculated to be approximately 20% greater than 
measured in the second IPCC report. This will be partially offset by the fact that the 
GWP of nitrous oxide has fallen over by approximately 3%; however the relative size 
of the shifts implies that New Zealand’s total emission level will go up as a result of 
this shift. 
 
It is often assumed that New Zealand will gain from shifts that decrease its CO2e 
emission levels and will lose from approaches that increase its CO2e emission levels. 
However, this view is somewhat too simplistic since in the burden sharing 
frameworks discussed above involve setting percentage targets from a base line 
emission level. As a result, any drop in emission levels will also decrease the quantity 




It is possible that future agreements will use 2000 or 2005 as a base year rather than 
1990. Although there is no strong ethical basis for this shift, it will allow countries 
that have had large increases in emission levels since 1990 to meet their likely post-
2012 targets more easily. For such reasons, Canada, Japan, the United States, and 
Australia may well favour such a change. A shift in the base year would certainly help 




It is unclear what weight, if any, should be given to population growth in calculating 
national emission targets. On the one hand, weighing targets on the basis of 
population growth would be consistent with the claim that all people have an equal 
right to emit. Further, it would avoid punishing countries that currently have young 
populations (and/or significant inward migration flows), since these countries 
naturally tend to have high population growth rates. On the other hand, tying emission 
allowance to changing population levels would weaken incentives for countries to 
limit their population growth – a step that may well need to be considered in the long 
term. New Zealand’s population is projected to grow at rate higher than the developed 
countries’ average but will probably grow slower than the developing countries’ 
average18. Therefore, New Zealand will probably benefit from taking into account 
population growth if only developed countries take on targets but it is ambiguous 





Neither international aviation nor maritime emissions were included in CP1, partly 
because of the complexities of the issues. However, future commitment periods will 
almost certainly need to contain some method of dealing with these emissions. 
Because of New Zealand’s distance from other countries, it will be affected 




To sum up, the following conclusions deserve note. First, ethical considerations, 
including well-established principles of justice, have a strong role to play in designing 
global policies to mitigate climate change, and are highly relevant to the current 
negotiations for a new climate change agreement.  
 
Second, of the six principles of justice considered in this paper, some clearly have a 
stronger ethical foundation than others. Additionally, some principles are more 
relevant to the issues surrounding climate change mitigation and adaptation than 
others. In particular, the principles of equality, capacity, historical responsibility and 
welfare costs deserve serious consideration in formulating any burden sharing 
framework. 
 
                                                 
18 Although large uncertainties surround projections of developing countries population growth rates 
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Third, all of the major proposed burden sharing frameworks are open to criticism on 
the grounds that, at least in the short run, they give inadequate weight to one or more 
of the most relevant principles of justice. Unfortunately, frameworks that give 
stronger weighting to the most relevant principles seem politically unfeasible – 
largely because they would require most developed countries to undertake a larger 
mitigation burden than they are prepared to accept. One partial solution would be for 
developed countries to accept a disproportionate share of the costs related to 
adaptation, technology transfer and financing. But this is also likely to be politically 
difficult. 
 
Finally, our analysis of the principles of justice point to the need for New Zealand to 
accept responsibility for a relatively large share of the costs (on a per capita basis) of 
addressing climate change. It is also evident that the magnitude of the costs New 
Zealand will face under any post-2012 agreement will depend significantly on the 
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